South Canyon Wild Fire

Luke MasieroMay 4, 2012Argu handstative essayWRTG 3020 Children Shouldnt Play With disregard The s discoverhernmost canon apprise that burned Storm King muddle for ten days during July of 1994 remains one of the most tragic approachs in conscientious objectors history. But what truly makes this catastrophe a huge tragedy is how easily it every(prenominal) could know been avoided. In book perk up on the Mountain John Maclean tells the true story of the randomness canon chevy and mis heads made that ca determinationd this disaster.There are mevery questions surrounding the s push throughherly Canyon Fire tragedy, why did it take so long for government agencies in charge of timberland call forth quelling to urge this drive tabu, and how were the firefighters in south-central Canyon not informed of the deadly conditions that took their lives? Communication and cooperation between quality service agencies is essential to coordinate equipment and men when attempting to fight a forest fire the magnitude of The South Canyon fire. In Colorado during July of 1994 the gummy elements were missing among the forest service agencies in western Colorado.The lack of conference and cooperation fueled by childish rivalries between the Bureau of Land precaution (BLM) larger-than-life articulation territorial dominion and the horse opera be given Coordination Center extend the forbiddance of the South Canyon Fire causing it to grow out of control taking the lives of 14 fire fighters. These rivalries over jurisdiction, resources and reputation hindered conference efforts, and halted resources from arriving at the South Canyon Fire to attempt too soon suppression efforts.Both Forest Services birdcall that receivable to the great number of vast forest fires burning in Colorado the summer of 1994 the BLM cubic yard marijuana cigarette zone and Western be given Coordination Center were short on men and equipment and searched for help among other agencies who had to be certain the South Canyon Fire was an imminent threat to pack or property before they could chip in men and resource to a site. scorn multiple red pivot warnings the South Canyon Fire burned for days until it was recognized as a top priority.When 30 year fire veteran mike Lowry arrived at the Western run Coordination Center to assist with this crisis of forest fires in western Colorado he was immediately concerned Cooperation, the touchstone of redbrick firefighting was virtually nonexistent. Instead Lowry found competition, jealousies, and outdated thinking and policies. increasing the difficulties of traffic with the South Canyon Fire (Maclean 24).The rivalry between the BLMs Grand Junction District and the Western Slope Coordination Center dates all the counselling back to 1978 when the Western Slope Coordination Center was given responsibility for coordination of argument support for 11 fire orders, the situation here was that the Western Slope s bare-ass responsibilities overlapped with jurisdictions and functions held by the BLM (Maclean 31). This friction between the BLM and the Western Slope Center scraggy important resources from being deployed.Maclean noted that Lowry reported work outing fleets of air tankers under Western Slopes control sitting idle each morning when weather conditions were optimal for fighting fires, but it was the BLMs Grand Junction District responsibility to bespeak these tankers. In an attempt to give up money and not over pay Western Slope, the BLM would hold off until the afternoon to request tankers, enhancing the risk of fire growing but reducing costs (Maclean 25). If the BML had bespeak the tankers from Western Slope earlier, the tankers could see doused the South Canyon Fire on July 3 when it was small and avoided death and destruction.Instead they delayed suppression efforts and a fire that would eat up cost only when a few thousand dollars to hold back ended up costing mi llions of dollars destroying hundreds of acres and ending the lives 14 fire fighters. As the days passed the South Canyon Fire was growing but nobody at the BLM was calling for help (Maclean 25) without relaying this information other offices were hack out of the loop which further delayed action in South Canyon (Maclean 32). The BLM Grand Junction Districts lack of communication lead other agencies to accuse their personnel of controlling all the shots(Maclean 32).On July 3 time was of the essence and since the BLM was not making any calls, Lowry took the initiative to do so. Lowry needed more(prenominal) men and resources than the western Colorado districts could provide and the only place these necessities could be attained was from the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise (Maclean 26). Since the BLMs Grand Junction Districts communication did not spark far the South Canyon Fire crisis was not discern and it would take 24 hours for the very much needed reinforc ements from Boise to land in Colorado, valuable time that allowed the South Canyon Fire to run wild (Maclean 26). Despite all the idiculous time wasting displayed by the BLM Grand Junction District and the Western Slope Coordination Center Managers from both agencies claimed they did everything in their power to fight this fire. In defense of their actions managers from the BLM Grand Junction District and Western Slope Coordination Center recall the climate and weather during the Colorado summer of 1994. Colorado was experiencing a drought along with intense heat, creating an environment very persuadable to fire so the BLM announced an aggressive policy of beleaguering all fires as soon as they were spotted a policy they think to uphold (Maclean 4).When powerful electric storms struck western Colorado early in July 1994 the BLM reported 15 forest fires in the Grand Junction District (Maclean p. 7). According to the BLMs new police they needed to attack these 15 fires but they did not have enough fire fighters to be every where at once. The BLM Grand Junction District would have benefitted from the use of planes on some of the smaller fires in inaccessible locations but the BLM music director for Colorado, Bob Moore, stuck to an older policy allowing no air tanker to dispatch retardant unless a crew was on the ground to cover it up (Maclean 25).Moore and other upper management also claim they did not rick involved in the incident until after it was evident there was a disaster on their hands, since the South Canyon fire did appear to be less wild than other fires in Colorado during this time the BLM did not mark it as a high priority fire. The BLM and Western Slope agencies required more men. In an attempt to help the BLM and Western Slope Lowry tried to order a huge quantity of fire fighters from the restive Mountain Coordination Center, twenty crews amounting to 400 people but they never came (Maclean 26).This was due to managements at the Rocky Mounta in Coordination Center they simply did not know how to go closely getting that many people together and transporting them to South Canyon (Maclean 26). Finally Lowry turned to the NIFC for help asking them to provide any additional crews of fire fighters or equipment so that he would be prepared when the fire did get large. NIFC is very hesitant to commit crews and equipment before an out break in the fire occurs (Maclean 29).This is a difficult decision for the NIFC because during fire season lots of fires do occur the problem is, not designed where and when the worst fires strike, the NIFC wants to ensure that their assistance is truly need. The BLM and Western Slope Coordination claim that they made every effort to get more fire fighters and equipment to South canyon but the other districts and agencies they went to for help did not see the malignity lurking beneath the smock column in South Canyon and resolute to allocate their resources else where.It is only natural for th e BLM Grand Junction District and the Western Slope Coordination Center to defend their actions, but there is so much evidence that points to the lack cooperation between these neighboring agencies that it is difficult not to see a correlation between the tragedy and uncooperative attitudes. The bad melodic phrase between the BLM and Western Slope created by their rivalry created a stern dynamic one that never stood a chance against a Fire like the South Canyon blowup.A catastrophe of this magnitude was predicted in an analyse conducted by BLM officials from other districts. These officials reported differences in resource management philosophies, personalities, misconceptions about the use of prescribed fire, had an unclear understanding of the position roles and responsibilities seem to have created a difficult situation with respect to the management of fire, they couldnt have been more spot on (Maclean 31).Team work and cooperation are zippy when fighting fires, the diametr ic crew members ranging from Hot Shots, Smoke Jumpers and members of management have to work together cohesively to have the best chance of putting out a fire quickly and safely. The relationship between the BLMs Grand Junction District and the Western Slope Coordination Center was far from cooperative. Their inability to work together because of an immature rivalry prolonged their fire suppression efforts to a point that their actions or lack there of attributed to the death of the 14 fire fighters who lost there lives during the South Canyon Fire.Fighting forest fires is a dangerous and deadly occupation, it is unacceptable for such childish behavior to be present in these government agencies who are meant to protect the property and people of the United States. Its impossible for the BLM and Western Slope Coordination Center to save anyone if the agencies are fighting amongst them selves. Something needs to be done to create a sense of unity among the BLM Grand Junction District and the Western careen because their oor relationship affects districts throughout the state. One possible solution would be to have fire fighters switch places with another fire fighter from a different district only for about two weeks. This would allow the different district to inter act and better get to know one another. irrespective of what the solution is something must be done, before another fire consumes more lives. Work Cited Page Maclean, Norman. Fire on the Mountain the True allegory of the South Canyon Fire. New York William Morrow, 1999. Print.